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51 
GINA’S GENOTYPES 
David H. Kaye* † 
In August 2009, the Board of Trustees of the University of Akron added 
to the university’s employment policy the following proviso: “any applicant 
may be asked to submit fingerprints or DNA sample for purpose of a federal 
criminal background check.” Although the federal government does not do 
background checks with DNA, the policy is significant because it highlights 
a largely unexplored feature of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act of 2008 (“GINA”). Hailed by the late Senator Edward Kennedy as “the 
first civil rights bill of the new century of life sciences,” GINA generally 
prohibits employers from asking for “genetic information.” The faculty sen-
ate and outside commentators have declared that the Akron policy is “of 
doubtful legality” because it “appears to violate” GINA. However, appear-
ances can be deceptive. GINA’s ban on the acquisition of “genetic 
information” also can be read so that it does not reach nonmedical DNA 
tests. Because employers have nondiscriminatory reasons to use forensic 
DNA identification technology, this narrower interpretation is more faithful 
to the express purpose of the law. 
I. Reasons for Employers to Collect 
DNA Identification Profiles 
A spokeswoman for the University of Akron justified potential DNA 
sampling by suggesting that DNA would soon replace fingerprinting as the 
main technology used for criminal identification: “By including it in the 
policy we have the flexibility to match the technology if the Ohio State 
Highway Patrol makes changes to its system.” But if this is what the trustees 
were thinking, they were misinformed. Law enforcement agencies are not 
soon likely to abandon fingerprinting as the routine form of personal identi-
fication. Advances in technology are improving automated comparisons of 
fingerprints, while DNA identification profiling does not distinguish be-
tween monozygotic twins (a situation that occurs in about 4 out of every 
1000 births). 
Despite the vacuity of the University of Akron’s articulated basis for 
collecting DNA, some employers have legitimate reasons to acquire DNA 
information. A laboratory that performs forensic DNA typing, for instance, 
might wish to build a database of its employees’ profiles so that the labora-
tory, the police, prosecutors, judges, and juries can be sure that the reported 
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DNA profiles are free of contamination from the employees’ DNA. An ex-
treme example of such contamination comes from “the Phantom of 
Heilbronn.” Police in Germany linked DNA evidence from 40 crimes—
including the homicide of a policewoman in the southern German town of 
Heilbronn—to the same woman. Her DNA was found in samples from items 
ranging from a cookie to a heroin syringe to a stolen car. The police con-
sulted diviners and fortune-tellers before they were able to match the 
mysterious DNA profile with a worker at a factory in Austria that produced 
cotton swabs used to collect DNA samples at crime scenes.  
Employers other than forensic laboratories may have plausible reasons 
to acquire DNA identification profiles from selected employees. New York 
City already requires police officers who handle crime-scene materials to 
provide DNA samples. Beyond identification for elimination purposes in 
criminal investigations, a laboratory performing genetic tests for medical 
diagnosis that experiences a problem with contamination might use em-
ployee DNA profiles to determine which employee is the source of the 
extraneous DNA. Indeed, even employers who do not handle DNA samples 
could find forensic DNA analysis of employees useful in internal investiga-
tions of theft or sexual conduct on company property. Suppose that an 
employee complains that she believes that a coworker, who made unwel-
come advances toward her, anonymously sent her parents a used condom 
with a vulgar note stating that the condom belonged to her boyfriend. The 
complaining employee gives the condom to the employer, who has it ana-
lyzed for DNA. If the profile does not correspond to the boyfriend’s, the 
employer might well request that the alleged harasser submit a DNA sample 
or profile. Although this example may seem contrived, it parallels the facts 
in In re McClain.1 In the case, the Indiana Supreme Court removed a judge 
from office because he “engaged in a pattern of harassment and abuse of 
office directed toward a female court employee and her family and boy-
friend.” In its investigation, the state judicial qualifications commission 
asked for a blood sample, and the supreme court emphasized that unwilling-
ness to cooperate “may in itself constitute independent grounds for 
disciplinary charges.” Thus, McClain reveals that employers can reasonably 
request or require employees to provide DNA samples or profiles for identi-
fication purposes. 
II. GINA as a Bar to Collecting DNA Identification Profiles 
A. The Purpose of the Law 
Although at first blush, the Akron policy appears to violate GINA’s pro-
scriptions, a closer analysis reveals that DNA testing strictly for 
identification does not conflict with the underlying goals of the statute. The 
legal pundits who have spoken out on the Akron policy have condemned it. 
                                                                                                                      
 1. 662 N.E.2d 935 (Ind. 1996). 
KAYE2 FINAL.DOC 2/6/2010 1:24 PM 
January 2010] Gina’s Genotypes 53 
 
An attorney and consultant for Johns Hopkins University’s Genetics and 
Public Policy Center opined that: 
GINA clearly prohibits the collection of a DNA sample from employees or 
prospective employees by the University of Akron . . . . One of the primary 
targets for GINA was employers collecting genetic information from [em-
ployees] and using it to make decisions about hiring and firing and 
promotions. It’s that kind of discrimination that GINA was designed to 
prohibit. 
But is an employer’s use of the DNA loci whose variations are recorded in 
criminal-offender databases—loci that have no significant medical applica-
tions2—really the “kind of discrimination that GINA was designed to 
prohibit”? The Act is concerned with medical information, not biometric 
information. Section 2 explains that Congress was worried about “[n]ew 
knowledge about the genetic basis of illness [allowing] for earlier detection 
of illnesses, often before symptoms have begun, [thus giving] rise to the 
potential misuse of genetic information to discriminate in health insurance 
and employment.” Congress listed examples of discrimination including: 
“sterilization laws by the States based on early genetic science,” actions 
taken against individuals with an allele for sickle cell anemia, and more re-
cent cases in which employers allegedly performed genetic tests relating to 
specific medical conditions. Thus, GINA’s stated objective is to establish “a 
national and uniform basic standard . . . to fully protect the public from dis-
crimination and to allay concerns about the potential for discrimination, 
thereby allowing individuals to take advantage of genetic testing, technolo-
gies, research, and new therapies.” 
B. The Statute as Prophylaxis 
It is hard to imagine how the Akron policy would discourage individuals 
from seeking appropriate medical care or volunteering for genetic research. 
Still, potential employees might worry that if the university has samples of 
their DNA, it could use them—not for criminal background checks—but for 
rejecting their applications on the basis of genetic tests that indicate in-
creased risk for certain diseases. Although the attempt to distinguish 
between using genetic and nongenetic medical information in employment 
decisions is fundamentally flawed,3 using a sample collected for identifica-
tion purposes to limit employment opportunities because of medically 
relevant tests is the kind of “discrimination” that “GINA was designed to 
prohibit.” 
Consequently, the question becomes whether Congress chose to ban, as 
a prophylactic measure, the collection of cells from job applicants because 
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of the risk that an employer might engage in such conduct. The president of 
the Council for Responsive Genetics has suggested that Congress did ex-
actly this. He argues that because “GINA specifically prohibits employers 
from requesting or requiring genetic information” and “does not draw a dis-
tinction about how the DNA sample could be or should be used,” it follows 
that employers may not request DNA samples from present or prospective 
employees. 
The premise of this argument is correct. GINA makes it generally illegal 
for “an employer to request, require, or purchase genetic information with 
respect to an individual” (emphasis added). Nonetheless, although some 
bioethicists maintain that a DNA molecule is itself genetic information,4 
GINA does not explicitly prohibit the acquisition and storage of “informa-
tion” in this extended sense. Instead, GINA defines “genetic information” as 
“information about [an] individual’s genetic tests.” It defines a “genetic 
test” as “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or me-
tabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.” 
Plainly, the tested sample—that is, the biological material taken from the 
employee—is neither a genetic test nor information about that test. 
C. Defining Mutations and Genotypes in Science and Law 
Because the DNA sample is not itself “genetic information,” we must 
ascertain whether asking for a DNA sample for identification purposes con-
stitutes requesting “genetic information” within the meaning of the statute. I 
shall consider three modes of interpretation—literal, intentional, and pur-
posive. A literalist could argue that the words “mutations” and “genotypes” 
clearly encompass identification testing. Biologically, all genetic variation 
in a population results from mutations. Furthermore, forensic scientists have 
been known to refer to the medically uninformative alleles used in DNA 
identification testing as “DNA genotypes.”5 
Yet, “genotype” usually refers to a gene—a long (and possibly inter-
rupted) sequence of DNA that guides the production of proteins in cells, 
thus generating observable effects or traits (“phenotypes”) in the organism. 
Because the DNA variations used for identification—particular short-
tandem-repeat (“STR”) alleles—produce no differences in phenotypes, it is 
odd to characterize them as genotypes. The justification for doing so is that 
even nonsense DNA sequences are inherited in the same manner as the clas-
sical genes that influence physical traits. That the STRs are subject to 
Mendel’s laws, however, does not mean that they are genotypes. The se-
quences used for identification do not work like genes, which influence 
phenotypes. Thus, the literalist analysis is inconclusive. 
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A deeper problem with blindly importing a scientific definition is that it 
divorces text from context, producing an interpretation of “genetic informa-
tion” that is not faithful to the purpose of the law or the intent of its drafters. 
As noted earlier, GINA is concerned with what are popularly known as dis-
ease mutations—changes in functional DNA sequences that affect an 
individual’s disease status—or markers for those mutations. Why, then, 
should GINA be construed to reach tests for DNA variations that are not 
themselves genes? The answer does not lie in genetics textbooks or diction-
aries of biology. A scientific term in a statute need not function the same 
way it does in biology. In Nix v. Hedden,6 for instance, the Supreme Court 
had no difficulty classifying a tomato as a vegetable under the Tariff Act of 
March 3, 1883, although botanists regard a tomato as a fruit. 
Generally, to give content to technical or scientific terms that might have 
been used imprecisely in legislation, courts look to the evils that the statute 
is designed to mitigate.7 A purposive analysis emphasizes that GINA is a 
“civil rights law” intended to eliminate “discrimination” against asympto-
matic individuals. Because the STR profiles used in identification are not 
variations in genes and carry no medical information that would be valuable 
for prediction or diagnosis, it is not immediately clear that Congress used 
the words “genetic information,” “genotype,” or even “mutations,” to pro-
hibit employers from requiring employees to provide an identifying STR 
profile. 
D. And Yet . . .  
Despite this conclusion, the theory that STR profiles are not genetic in-
formation (as opposed to genomic information) is subject to a major 
objection. Section 202(b)(6) explicitly allows an employer to acquire ge-
netic information “where the employer conducts DNA analysis for law 
enforcement purposes as a forensic laboratory or for purposes of human 
remains identification, and requests or requires genetic information of such 
employer’s employees, but only to the extent that such genetic information 
is used for analysis of DNA identification markers for quality control to de-
tect sample contamination.” Why would Congress include this exception if 
“genetic information” is confined to information about genes? If Congress 
found it expedient to have an exception for some loci that are not genes, 
then it must have intended the word “genetic” to reach all manner of “muta-
tions.” 
Although initially appealing, this intent-based analysis is not ultimately 
persuasive. Several explanations for the law-enforcement and human-
remains exceptions are available. First, Congress might have understood 
“genetic information” to be limited to the activity of genes, but adopted the 
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exception as a response to the possibility, stressed by some legal commenta-
tors, that the loci used for identification have (or will turn out to have) 
medical diagnostic or predictive value.8 Legislators sharing this belief may 
have wanted to include the exception to forestall the need to amend the law 
in the future. Second, the sponsors of the bill may have believed that the 
exception was not strictly necessary in light of their understanding of “ge-
netic information” but still included it to circumvent any opposition from 
the law-enforcement and military lobbies. Finally, and most likely, individ-
ual legislators may not have had any view about the distinction between 
genomic and genetic information, but perceived no reason not to include the 
quality-control exception of section 202(b)(6) for laboratories conducting 
law enforcement and human remains testing. 
It is risky to try and guess what was in the minds of individual legisla-
tors, let alone discern Congressional intent regarding a matter that received 
very little attention and no debate. Rather than seek the mythical, subjective 
intent of individuals who never considered the issue, it seems better to adopt 
the purposive mode of interpretation. The point of the law is what matters. 
The phrase “genetic information” should be read so as to achieve the best fit 
between the statute and its goals. As stated countless times in committee, in 
floor debate, in public announcements, and most importantly, in the Act it-
self, GINA’s goal is not to regulate the flow of information about loci that 
are irrelevant to any action based on medically significant loci. The statu-
tory goal is to keep insurers and employers from making adverse decisions 
based on information, gleaned from testing genes or markers for genes, 
about the future health of a currently asymptomatic individual. To prevent 
such “discrimination” (and only such discrimination), GINA also blocks the 
acquisition of this “genetic information.” Fidelity to this statutory purpose 
suggests that neither this ancillary ban on acquisition of information nor the 
primary ban on use extends to nonmedical information, even if it happens to 
come from a limited inspection of the genome. DNA features that serve only 
as personal identifiers are not “genetic information” within the meaning of 
the statute. 
III. Toward a Broader Exception 
Despite the cramped phrasing of section 202(b)(6), the provision actu-
ally conforms to the manifest purpose of the statutory system. When GINA’s 
drafters actually confronted an instance of nonmedical information, they 
explicitly allowed employers to acquire the information. A purposive con-
struction of GINA’s words suggests that the outcome should be the same in 
other situations that involve only nonmedical information. Of course, textu-
alists might reject this conclusion. If one were to treat the absence of 
explicit exceptions for similar uses of data on DNA features that are 
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unrelated to the statute’s goals as if it were a legislative rejection of such 
exceptions, then it would be necessary to ask whether Congress should re-
turn to the drafting board.  
Whether and how to protect job applicants or employees who do not 
wish to supply a DNA identification profile are significant questions. In my 
view, when the procedures for collecting and analyzing DNA ensure that no 
medically related information that could affect employment status, condi-
tions, or benefits will come into existence, then a “nondiscrimination” law 
such as GINA should not tie an employer’s hands. Thus, a forensic labora-
tory—or other kind of laboratory—should be permitted to require its 
workers to provide their STR profiles for the purpose of laying to rest any 
suggestion that they have contaminated a sample with their own DNA. 
GINA explicitly recognizes this for some laboratories that do criminal case 
work or identify human remains, but the section 202(b)(6) exception for 
“quality control” applies only to employers who themselves “conduct[] 
DNA analysis for law enforcement purposes as a forensic laboratory or for 
purposes of human remains identification.” The police agency whose offi-
cers or evidence technicians collect DNA traces at crime scenes do not fall 
within this exemption. Neither do firms that produce the materials used by 
these agencies or by laboratories that analyze crime stains. The many labo-
ratories providing DNA tests in cases of disputed parentage and other civil 
matters also will find the exception of no avail. Still other laboratories per-
forming medical DNA tests that could be compromised by contamination 
will be unable to determine the specific source of the contamination using 
DNA identification methods. And, of course, the exception is useless for 
internal investigations of serious misconduct in cases like McClain. 
If the purposive reading of GINA were found wanting, one solution would 
be for Congress to craft a broader, explicit exception that lists all the situations 
in which an employer’s acquisition of genetic information does not threaten to 
produce “genetic discrimination” involving medical conditions in insurance 
and employment. But fully enumerating all the relevant exceptions could 
prove difficult. As experience with rape-shield laws demonstrate, the every-
thing-is-forbidden-except-that-which-is-explicitly-allowed approach tends to 
be overly restrictive.9 A more flexible solution would be to eliminate the 
cramped law-enforcement exception and to define “genetic information” (or 
replace it with a more transparent phrase) so that DNA identification profiles 
are not treated as if they were the disease-related “genotypes” or “muta-
tions” that are GINA’s true target. GINA is not a general genetic-privacy 
law. It is a nondiscrimination law. Judicially or legislatively, the definitions 
should be aligned so that “the first civil rights bill of the new century of life 
sciences” stays on target.  
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Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 763 (1986). 
